LETTER: Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is increasingly celebrated as a powerful tool in modern intelligence gathering, criminal investigations and national security.
With information readily available through social media, websites, digital platforms, public records, satellite imagery and online databases, individuals and organisations can now collect, analyse and interpret information without necessarily having access to classified intelligence or sophisticated investigative capabilities.
On the surface, this appears to be a positive development. However, we need to be much more critical about this growing phenomenon.
The fact that information is publicly available does not automatically make its collection, analysis, use or dissemination legitimate.
The real danger of OSINT is not merely the availability of information, but the ability to connect seemingly unrelated pieces of information and turn them into so-called intelligence that can expose individuals, compromise security, facilitate criminal activities and potentially cause serious harm.
For example, a photograph uploaded on social media, a location tagged during a holiday, a comment made on a public platform, a workplace profile or even interactions with friends and family can reveal far more than the individual originally intended.
Individually, these details may appear insignificant. However, when aggregated and analysed, they can expose someone’s identity, movements, relationships, daily routines and vulnerabilities.
We are looking at an environment where information originally intended for social interaction can be repurposed for surveillance, exploitation and victimisation.
The consequences may include stalking, doxxing, harassment, identity theft, intimidation and even physical harm. Thus, we need to stop equating accessibility with consent.
Even more concerning, OSINT is not exclusively available to law enforcement agencies, intelligence organisations or government offices. Criminals have access to the same information.
Organised crime groups, scammers, traffickers, hackers and other offenders can exploit publicly accessible information to identify potential victims, understand their vulnerabilities and construct convincing approaches to manipulate them.
Another worrying development is the growing practice of individuals and online communities conducting their own investigations using OSINT and subsequently publishing their findings on social media.
There is a fundamental difference between identifying a potential lead and establishing that someone has committed a criminal offence.
A photograph, social media account, geolocation record or online interaction does not, on its own, establish criminal liability.
We cannot allow the democratisation of intelligence gathering to become the democratisation of punishment.
OSINT findings are intelligence leads that require verification, not substitutes for proper investigations, evidential standards or judicial determination.
The presumption of innocence should not become optional simply because an accusation is supported by information circulating online.
From a national security perspective, the implications are equally serious.
Information relating to military installations, critical infrastructure, government facilities, security personnel and operational movements may be available through photographs, satellite imagery and social media activity
When systematically analysed, these seemingly ordinary pieces of information can reveal security vulnerabilities, patterns of movement and potential targets.
Hostile actors, terrorist organisations and extremist networks can exploit such information for reconnaissance, target identification, propaganda and operational planning.
The distinction between what is public and what is operationally sensitive is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.
The emergence of artificial intelligence makes the situation even more complicated. AI can accelerate the collection, processing, correlation and analysis of enormous volumes of publicly accessible information.
It can identify patterns, connect individuals to particular networks and generate profiles based on fragmented digital traces. However, speed and analytical capability should never be confused with accuracy.
Images can be manipulated, videos taken out of context, accounts falsely attributed and digital identities misrepresented. AI-generated content further complicates the verification process.
The danger is not simply that false information may be circulated, but that false information can be presented in a convincing analytical format, giving it an appearance of credibility that it does not deserve.
We must question whether investigators and decision-makers are becoming overly dependent on technological outputs without sufficiently examining the reliability, provenance and context of the information being analysed.
The most important issue is accountability. Who regulates and holds OSINT practitioners accountable?
When law enforcement agencies collect intelligence, their activities should operate within applicable legal and institutional safeguards.
But what happens when private individuals, commercial entities or online groups undertake similar activities?
What limits their ability to collect, analyse, profile and disseminate personal information? What recourse does an individual have when wrongly identified, exposed or targeted?
And who assumes responsibility when information gathered through OSINT contributes to harassment, reputational damage or physical harm?
Our existing legal frameworks must be examined in the context of how personal information is collected, processed, disclosed and potentially misused.
We should not allow the language of intelligence, transparency or public interest to become a convenient justification for intrusive practices without proper accountability.
This does not in any way suggest that OSINT should be discouraged. Its value in modern criminal investigations, intelligence gathering and threat assessment is undeniable.
However, its usefulness should not exempt it from scrutiny.
There must be greater emphasis on the legality, necessity and proportionality of information gathering, the reliability of sources, verification of findings and accountability for the consequences of their use.
Law enforcement agencies must also maintain a clear distinction between intelligence and evidence.
Intelligence may provide investigative direction, but it must still be tested, corroborated and assessed in accordance with applicable evidential requirements.
The ability to access information should never be confused with the right to exploit it.
A more important question is not how much intelligence we can gather through OSINT, but how much harm we may be creating in the process.
DR HAEZREENA BEGUM ABDUL HAMID
Criminologist and senior lecturer
Faculty of Law
Universiti Malaya
